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LIMITING FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT POWER
AFTER SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ORDERS
One year after the United States Supreme Court declared segrega-
tion in public schools unconstitutional,1 the Court delegated primary
responsibility for remedying segregated conditions to local school offi-
cials. 2 Where school officials failed, the Court instructed district
courts to fashion effective desegregation remedies through the use of
their broad equitable powers. The Supreme Court, however, in de-
lineating the scope of these powers, has cautioned that although equit-
able powers are traditionally broad, they are nevertheless subject to
certain limitations. 3 In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,4
the Supreme Court held that a district court had exceeded the limits of
its power and authority in refusing to modify a desegregation order
which after initial compliance required annual readjustment of student
attendance zones in response to demographic shifts.
In 1970 the district court determined that the Pasadena Unified
School District was unconstitutionally segregated 5 and ordered im-
1. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann,
the Supreme Court reviewed the duties of school authorities and established general
guidelines for the scope of equitable powers of the courts. The Court held that Title IV of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 407, 42 U.S.C § 2000c-6 (1970), did not restrict or withdraw
from federal courts their existing equitable powers. Such equitable powers permitted
judicial intervention in assignment of teachers, staff and students and in the areas of
school construction and pupil transportation. Remedies that would require "inflexible"
student racial quotas, however, were held to be beyond the equitable power of courts.
Remedial jurisdiction continued only until the achievement of the "unitary school
system." 402 U.S. at 33.
4. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
5. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd,
427 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970). The district court found that the school board: (1) drew
attendance zone boundaries so as to increase segregation, (2) located new schools or
additions to existing schools so as to increase segregation, (3) promoted a neighborhood
school policy and a policy against cross-town busing tending to increase segregation, (4)
allowed schools to remain racially identifiable by the composition of their faculties, (5)
discriminiated in the hiring and promotion of faculty and staff, (6) assigned teachers with
less experence and training to schools with predominantly black enrollments, (7) utilized
busing which imposed an undue share of burdens of desegregation on black students,
and (8) made a series of educational policy decisions which were based wholly or in part
on considerations of the race of students or teachers which contributed to racial segrega-
tion. On the basis of these violations, the court concluded that defendants had an
affirmative constitutional duty to "promote integration." Id. at 504. The school board
did not appeal this order.
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pementation of a desegregation plan.6 The "Pasadena Plan" included,
in part, a requirement that no school in the district have a "majority of
any minority" students. The school district initially complied with the
"no majority" requirement,7 but in 1974, the school board sought
modification of the plan's "no majority" requirement. 8 The district
court denied relief9 because the racial composition of five of the
thirty-two schools in the district no longer complied with the "no
majority" requirement. 10 The court refused to accept the school
board's argument that noncompliance was attributable to "white
flight"'" in response to the desegregation decree, finding instead that
the population shifts closely approximated the demographic trend in
segregated and desegregated districts throughout the state.12 On appe-
6. Id. at 506.
7. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 375 F. Supp. 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd,
519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
8. The board sought to dissolve the district court's injunction, to terminate the
district court's retained jurisdiction over the actions of the school board or to obtain
approval of petitioner's modifications of the "Pasadena Plan." Id. at 1305.
9. The court found that the alternative plan proposed by the school board was a
"freedom of choice" plan which would not adequately desegregate the system. Id. at
1307. Express opposition by the community and board to the "Pasadena Plan" was also
a consideration in the district court's decision. Id. at 1305, 1309. In 1974, the school
board was found in contempt of the mandates of the "Pasadena Plan" in its hiring of
administrative personnel. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 846
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
10. 375 F. Supp. at 1306.
11. "White flight," or whites moving from a district to avoid the imposition of a
desegregation decree, does not alter a school board's affirmative duty to desegregate.
See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972)(demographic
changes resulting from the implementation of a desegregation decree held insufficient to
release the school board from its duty to achieve "anything less than complete uprooting
of the dual public school system."). Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489
F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975) (population shifts due to
"white flight" did not affect the school board's duty to convert to a "unitary system").
But cf. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976) (population shifts due to "voluntary withdrawal of white students" and other "de
facto" conditions that rendered a student assignment plan ineffective before initial
implementation held beyond control and responsibility of the school board).
12. 375 F. Supp. at 1306. In Petitioners Brief for Certiorari at 377, Pasedena City Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 423 U.S. 945 (1975), the Superintendant of Schools reported a loss
of 1,733 (5.9%) white students in the first month of the plan's implementation. This
report denied that the loss was solely the consequences of the plan, but did not deny that
some "white flight" to avoid integration may have taken place. A report written by one
member of the board of education reported a loss of 2,212 white students (12.4%) the
first year of the plan's implementation, and an additional loss of 1,800 white students
(11.5%) the second year. Id. at 424-25. The board attributed this drop from 58.3% in 1970
to 50% in 1971 to "white flight." Although rejecting this contention, the district court
nevertheless held that the school board was required to accommodate the demographic
changes in its student attendance zones.
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al, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the "no majority" requirement
would be unacceptable if it required perpetual annual readjustments of
student attendance zones.13 But the court affirmed denial of relief 14
noting two factors which indicated that the district court had not
abused its discretion: (1) there had been literal compliance with the
"no majority" requirement only for a few months after initial im-
plementation of the plan; and (2) the school board had been generally
uncooperative.15
The Supreme Court reversed 16 and held that the district court had
abused its equitable discretion by requiring attendance zone adjust-
ment to comply with the "no majority" requirement after initially
successful implementation. 7 The Court concluded that modification of
the requirement should therefore have been granted 18 and remanded
the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration.
Throughout the brief history of school desegregation litigation, the
permissible scope of a district court's equitable power to administer
13. 519 F.2d at 437-38. The court considered a "spontaneous" remark made by the
district judge during consideration of the motion for relief from the desegregation decree
that his interpretation of the order, "meant to me that at least during my lifetime there
would be no majority of any minority in any school in Pasadena." The court concluded,
however, that Swann's prohibition against annual readjustments became operative when
"there has been a full and genuine implementation which has eliminated, with some
anticipated permanence, racial discrimination from the system." Id. at 437. (emphasis
added.)
14. Id. at 440.
15. Id. at 434-35. The court responded to the school board's contention that desegre-
gation had been accomplished after implementation of the plan by noting that "such was
a transitory and temporary achievement, enduring for a period of utmost brevity." Id. at
437. The court reasoned that there was "abundant evidence upon which the districtjudge. . . could rightly determine that the 'dangers' which induced the original determi-
nation have not diminished sufficiently." Id. at 434. Cf. United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) (an injunctive order should be modified when it has become an
"instrument of wrong" due to changed circumstances and when "the changes are so
important that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow").
16. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). The Court rejected the contention of petitioners that the case
was moot because the original plaintiffs had graduated from the Pasadena school system.
The United States' intervention into the action was held sufficient to defeat mootness.
Id. at 431. The Court also considered the significance of the failure of the board to
appeal from the original decree as a potential bar to its request for modification. The
Court concluded that "this observation overlooks well-established rules governing mod-
ification of even a final decree entered by a court of equity." Id. at 438.
17. Id. at 435.
18. Id. at 438. The Court concluded that modification should have been ordered by
the court of appeals because of the ambiguity of the "no majority" requirement,
evidenced by the different interpretations by the district judge and the parties, and the
inconsistency of the district court's order with the Court's intervening decision in
Swann. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text infra.
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desegregation decrees has been a significant judicial concern. The
Supreme Court first considered this issue in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (Brown II). 19 Considering the complexities presented in determin-
ing appropriate relief for a constitutional violation, the Court stated
that district courts were to be guided by the "practical flexibility" of
equitable principles .20 The Court directed district courts to consider the
adequacy of any plans proposed by school boards in order to effec-
tuate a transition to a nondiscriminatory school system and to retain
jurisdiction until "a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis" is achieved.
21
Despite the breadth of equitable powers accorded to district courts
in Brown II, fashioning effective remedies proved to be a difficult
task. Lower courts were confronted with dilatory tactics by school
boards resulting in delays in achieving the "unitary system" required
by Brown 11.22 The Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board23
19. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
20. Id. at 300. For an indication of the flexibility of equitable powers, see System
Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) (a court of equity may modify the terms of
an injunctive decree if changing circumstances require such modification); United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) (a continuing injunction directed to future events is
subject to adaptation since events may shape needs).
21. 349 U.S. at 300-01. Determination of admission on a nonracial basis was later
termed the "unitary school system." Two Supreme Court decisions expanded this
definition. In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,438 (1968), the Court described
a "unitary system" as one "in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." One year later in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20
(1969), the Court added to the Green definition that a "unitary system" was one "within
which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color."
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971) ("At some
point, these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full compliance
with this Court's decision in Brown 1. The systems would then be 'unitary' in the sense
required by our decisions in Green and Alexander.").
22. An example of a remedy initially accepted by district courts, but later rejected,
was the "freedom of choice" plan. This plan allowed students and their parents to
decide which school the student was to attend, thus placing the burden of desegregation
on students and their parents and thereby relieving the school board of its affirmative
duty to desegregate. Theoretically, such a plan would seem to provide "a system for
determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis." In practice, however,
such plans were later held to be inadequate to discharge the affirmative duty to desegre-
gate once a constitutional violation has been established because they rarely produce
adequate changes. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I,
13 (1971)(the Court discusses the inadequacy of such a plan in light of the minimal
progress of desegregation in the post-Brown years); Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968); Note, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of
the Federal Courts?, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 113, 116-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Remedies for School Segregation] (the author discusses the uncertainties which district
courts faced during this period as to what type of remedy should be used, i.e., gradual
versus immediate decrees). Cf. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come:
[Vol. 13:203
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responded to this problem by charging school boards with the affirma-
tive duty "to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch.''24 The Court instructed that "whatever plan is adopted
will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retain jurisdic-
tion until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely
removed."25 The effectiveness of any plan was to be measured against
the ultimate constitutional goal: "a unitary, nonracial system of public
education." 26
Although the pace of desegregation efforts accelerated after Green,
the extent of a district court's remedial powers and duties remained
uncertain because the concept of a "unitary system" had not been
precisely defined. 27 The Supreme Court has yet to provide such a
definition, 28 but the Court in Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 742, 768 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Fiss] (describes a shift in the purpose of
desegregation from one of giving minorities access to all schools to the more recent goal
of "dispersing" concentrations of minorities).
23. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
24. Id. at 437-38. The Court considered a "freedom of choice" plan which failed to
desegregate the dual school system formerly required by Virginia state law. The Court
declared the necessity for immediate relief to be of primary importance in desegregation
efforts: "[A] plan that at this late date fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt
and effective disestablishment of a dual system is. . . intolerable. . . .The burden on
a school board today is to come forward with a plan which promises to work. . . now."
Id. at 438-39.
25. Id. at 439. The Court stated that the implementation of the plan, "merely begins,
not ends, our inquiry whether the Board has taken adequate steps to abolish its dual,
segregated system." Id. at 437.
26. Id. at 436. Courts were to evaluate the adequacy of school board actions under
deseregation plans with "an awareness that complex and muti-faceted problems would
arise which would require time and flexibility for a successful resolution." Id. at 437.
Time and flexibility were necessary to assure the eradication of the compounded harm
resulting from well-entrenched and deliberately perpetuated dual systems. Id. See
Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (rejecting "freedom of choice" and
requiring retained jurisdiction); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968)(re-
jecting "freedom of choice").
27. See Remedies for School Segregation, supra note 22, at 120. The author discusses
the substantial uncertainty of the district courts in formulating desegregation plans after
Green due to the Court's failure to define such terms as "dual system," "unitary
system," "segregation," "integration," and "racially identifiable."
28. But see Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232 (1970). Chief Justice Burger,
in a concurring opinion, responded to those who contended that the Court had not
defined the "unitary system":
The suggestion that the Court has not defined a unitary school system is not
supportable. In Alexander v. Holms County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969)
we stated, albeit perhaps too cryptically, that a unitary system was one "within
1977]
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Education,29 did respond to these uncertainties and attempted to
clarify the permissible power. In Swann, the Court reaffirmed the
broad equitable power of district courts to "assure a unitary system' 30
in which all "vestiges of state-imposed segregation" 31 have been elimi-
nated. The Court cautioned, however, that this power was subject to
limitation. Although racial ratios were approved as "a starting point in
the process of shaping a remedy," the Court declared the use of
"inflexible" quotas unacceptable. 32 The Court also disapproved reme-
dial orders that required "year by year adjustments of the racial
composition of student bodies" extending beyond the point at which
"the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial
discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system."
33
Finally, the Court stated that after a "unitary system" has been
which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or
color.
Id. at 236-37.
29. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See note 3 supra.
30. Id. at 16. In a companion case to Swann, Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402
U.S. 33 (1971), the Court reiterated the necessity for effectuating adequate plans to
achieve this goal: "Having once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities
should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,
taking into account the practicalities of the situation. . . .The measure of any desegre-
gation plan is its effectiveness." Id. at 37.
31. 402 U.S. at 16. The interpretation of "vestiges" in a formerly dual system has
varied in lower courts. See, e.g., Mapp v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976) ("de facto" demographic changes which negated
desegregation efforts before the plan's implementation were not "vestiges" requiring
remedial relief); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 930 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975) (a large number of racially identifiable
schools gives rise to a presumption "that all vestiges of state imposed segregation have
not been eliminated"); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Disrt., 373 F. Supp. 1264,
1267 (W.D. Tex. 1973)("vestiges" in the nonunitary system were described as (1) most
blacks continued to attend racially identifiable schools, (2) school faculties and staff
continued to be racially identifiable, and (3) minority schools were underutilized whereas
white schools were frequently overcrowded). Cf. J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS. THE COURTS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 27 (1974) (the tendency of California courts is to view "racial
imbalance as a vestige of state-imposed segregation").
32. 402 U.S. at 25. The Court indicated that it would be "obliged to reverse" a
district court order if interpreted "to require as a matter of substantive constitutional
right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing." Id. at 24. Strict ratio require-
ments, however, were not per se unacceptable. Citing United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1969), the Court explained that specific
initial requirements may be desirable to expedite the unitary status of a school system.
402 U.S. at 19-20.
33. 402 U.S. at 31-32. The Court's decision in Swann was partially codified in the
Equal Educational Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1707 (Supp. IV 1974), which limits the
exercise of judicial power where de facto segregation occurs subsequent to judicial
determination that the system is "unitary."
[Vol. 13:203
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achieved, only a showing of deliberate attempts by state officials "to
fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the
schools" would warrant further judicial intervention.34
After Swann lower courts dealt with racial quotas and readjustments
in various ways.3 5 The proper use of these remedies is problematic
since the definition of "unitary system" remains imprecise. 36 The
Ninth Circuit in Spangler recognized the racial quota and readjustment
limitations imposed by Swann, but concluded that these limitations
became operative only upon the achievement of the "unitary system"
34. 402 U.S. at 32. Two years after its decision in Swann, the Court decided Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Court held that in a northern school system
"where no statutory dual system has ever existed, plaintiffs must prove not only that
segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intention-
al state action." Id. at 198. Once segregative intent was shown in one school, it would be
possible to impute segregative intent to an entire school system: "[C]ommon sense
dictates the conclusion that racially inspired school board actions have an impact beyond
the particular schools that are the subjects of those actions." Id. at 203. The Court also
recognized the "connection between past segregative acts and present segregation" and
instructed that "close examination is required before concluding that the connection
does not exist." Id. at 211. For a general discussion of the revitalization of the de jure/de
facto distinction in Keyes, see Note, Segregative Intent and the Single Governmental
Entity in School Desegregation, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1114-16. One year after Keyes
the Court decided Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), in which opportunities for
desegregation were further restricted by the Court's holding that district lines could not
be crossed in designing a remedy unless an interdistrict violation was shown.
35. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Gilligan, 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1000 (1975)(the school board's duty was not adequately discharged because after im-
plementation of a plan, a pattern of one-race schools remained); Monroe v. County Bd.
of Educ., 505 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1974)(school system was not unitary because three
schools remained over 85% black); Boyd v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Bd., 505 F.2d
632 (5th Cir. 1974) (the school system was not unitary because eight of ten schools did
not meet racial balance requirements); Newburg Area Council, Inc., v. Board of Educ.,
489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975) (a large number of racially
identifiable schools was evidence that the school board's duty was not adequately
discharged); Quality Educ. for All Children, Inc. v. School Bd., 385 F. Supp. 803 (N.D.
I11. 1974) (predominantly one-race schools are not unconstitutional if the system is
genuinely integrated); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264
(W.D. Tex. 1973) (system was nonuntary because most blacks still attended "racially
identifiable" schools); Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 356 F. Supp. 675 (D. Conn. 1973)
(a racially neutral integration plan cannot be expected to produce an equal percentage;
the disparity does not create a prima facie case of discrimination).
36. See note 21 supra; Calhoun v. Cook, 525 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1975) (the system
was "unitary" despite the fact that further integration was theoretically possible);
United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate School Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss.
1976) (unitary status was achieved after seven years "of good faith compliance...
without serious incident of racial discrimination in educational policies" and where no
"vestiges of the former dual system" appeared). See also Remedies for School Segrega-
tion, supra note 22, at 117, 120. Comment, School Desegregation afterSwann:A Theory
of Government Responsibility, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 421, 436 (1972) (the point at which "a
dual system is sufficiently dismantled to become 'unitary' remains "a great mystery").
19771
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
which the court determined had not been accomplished in the Pasade-
na School District.37
The Supreme Court in Spangler rejected this application of Swann
and held that the initially successful implementation of a "racially
neutral attendance pattern" discharged the affirmative duty of the
school board with regard to student attendance zones 8 The Court
reasoned that limitations announced in Swann prohibited any court
action concerning student attendance zones until there had been a
showing of a violation subsequent to implementation. 39 The district
court had not found such a violation, but instead attributed the failure
of the student assignment plan to a de facto demographic trend.0 In
these circumstances, the Court stated that the "no majority" require-
ment was unacceptably "inflexible" because it apparently contem-
plated a " 'substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of
racial balance or mixing' which the Court in Swann expressly disap-
proved."-41 Finally, the Court held that doubts concerning the school
board's compliance with nondiscriminatory hiring and promotion of
teachers and administrators were irrelevant to the issue of whether the
school board had discharged its duty to desegregate student attendance
patterns. 42
Two premises derived from the Spangler majority's interpretation of
the Swann decision appear to underlie the Court's reasoning. First, the
majority will allow division of a desegregation plan into functional
segments. 43 Once the affirmative duty of the school board is dis-
charged with regard to student attendance, judicial intervention must
cease as to that particular function of the plan. This result may be
characterized as "piecemeal unitariness." Second, "unitariness"
37. 519 F.2d at 437. See note 13 supra.
38. 427 U.S. at 436-37.
39. Id. at 436.
40. See note 12 supra.
41. 427 U.S. at 434-35.
42. Id. at 436.
43. The Court has indicated six functions or indicia of a segregated school system
which must be scrutinized: placement of students, faculties, and staff, and policies
concerning transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 435 (1968).
44. Discrimination may exist in regard to other functions of the school system, but
this will not affect a finding that the school board has adequately discharged its duty to
desegregate student assignments. In Keyes, however, the Court indicated that it would
be "common sense" to conclude that "racially inspired school board actions have an
impact beyond the particular schools that are the subjects of those actions." 413 U.S. at
[Vol. 13:203
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may be found upon initial compliance with a desegregation decree. The
net effect of this reasoning permits an individual function of a school
system to be found "instantly unitary" upon a plan's implementa-
tion.45 Only a showing of further discriminatory actions on the part of
the school board or "white flight" attributable to the decree itself will
warrant further judicial intervention as to that function.46
The dissent rejected both premises as an unwarranted extension of
the Swann decision.47 According to the dissent, Swann's prohibition of
annual readjustments should become operative only upon achievement
of a "fully desegregated school system." 48 The dissent argued that the
majority's interpretation of Swann, allowing compliance "even for a
very short period" to satisfy the school board's affirmative duty,
might well frustrate the achievement of a wholly "unitary system" in
the Pasadena School District.49 The dissent concluded that the majori-
ty's interpretation limited the range of "discretion normally accorded
the District Court in fashioning equitable remedies," 50 and in doing so
203. From this conclusion, discrimination in one school system function would seem to
raise a presumption that discriminatory practices have an impact beyond the particular
function which is subject to those actions. The possibility of separate compliance as to
separate functions of a school system has not been generally recognized by lower courts.
See United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 393 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded sub. nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517
(1977) ("The constitutional duty of the school authorities is to establish a unitary system
not a unitary grade." (emphasis in original)); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
415 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969) ("Practically all of the Supreme Court decisions have
required desegregation of school systems and have not talked in terms of desegregating
only the method of student assignments or only the high schools.").
45. This result was dubbed by respondents in the action as a concept of "instant
unitariness." Brief for Respondents at 52, Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424 (1976). Respondents contended that "the very idea of 'instant unitariness' is
inconsistent with this Court's cases which hold that the district court must retain
jurisdiction to supervise the sometimes difficult transition to a unitary system." Id.
46. 427 U.S. at 435-36. See note 11 supra.
47. Id. at 442-43 (Marshall and Brennan, J.J. dissenting).
48. Id. at 443. According to the dissent, Swann recognized:
[Oin the one hand that a fully desegregated system may not be compelled to adjust
its attendance zones to conform to changing demographic patterns. But on the other
hand, it also appears to recognize that until such a unitary system is established, a
district court may act with broad discretion-which includes the adjustment of
attendance zones-so that the goal of a wholly unitary system might sooner be
achieved.
Id. (emphasis in original). The dissent concluded that in light of the school board's spirit
of noncompliance with the "Pasadena Plan," the district court had not abused its
discretion in refusing to modify its order. Id.
49. Id. at 442-43.
50. Id. at 444.
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would be likely to forestall the elimination of all the "vestiges" of
state-imposed segregation.51
The majority's holding in Spangler to allow brief, though immediate
relief to cure a constitutional violation departs from the reasoning of
prior desegregation cases. 52 In the past, the Court has instructed that
remedial relief should encompass the elimination of all the "ves-
tiges" '53 of a formerly dual system.54 The Court has ordered district
courts to retain jurisdiction until the achievement of a school system
free of all racial discrimination 5  and has indicated that "vestiges"
exist if the remaining segregation in a school system is directly con-
nected to past discriminatory policies and practices of the school
board. 56 For example, the Court has recognized that school board
decisions concerning the size and location of new schools may have a
long-range effect on the racial composition of schools. 57 Arguably the
racial composition of a school's faculty and administration might also
influence residential location decisions which in turn will affect a
school's racial composition. Therefore, doubts concerning the accep-
tability of Pasadena School Board policies in the hiring and promotion
of teachers and administrators should justify continued judicial super-
vision of all school board policies and practices. 58 By limiting the
51. Id.
52. See notes 25-26 supra.
53. Cf. Equal Education Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C § 1701(b)(Supp. IV 1974)(stat-
ing the policy of the United States to promote "the orderly removal of the vestiges of the
dual school system").
54. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
55. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968); Raney v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968); note 44 supra.
56. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,211 (1973). See Fiss, supra note 22, at
769-77; Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 697, 700 (1971) (both articles suggest that the causal
relationship between past discriminatory practices and present segregation tends to fill
the "ethical" void in the "result-oriented" approach of desegregation efforts). See
generally note 65 infra.
57. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971). The
Court recognized that school board decisions concerning school construction may be
used as a "potent weapon" in the creation or maintenance of a segregated system,
intimating that such decisions may in turn influence patterns of residential segregation.
58. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority rejected this position. The majority's
view may be explained by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keyes which held that once
segregative intent is shown in a substantial number of schools, intent may be imputed to
the entire school district: "Yet, unless the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment now be held to embody a principle of 'taint,' found in some primitive legal
systems but discarded centuries ago in ours, such a result can only be described as the
product of a judicial fiat." 413 U.S. at 257.
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district court's power in Spangler to influence student assignments,
the Court may be inhibiting "meaningful progress '59 toward the
achievement of a wholly "unitary system" in the Pasadena SchoolDistrict. 60
The decision in Spangler adds to the growing number of limitations
which the Supreme Court has placed on the remedial powers of district
courts in school desegregation cases. 61 The legal goal for which these
powers are utilized, the achievement of the "unitary system," remains
conceptually elusive.62 The "unitary system" has been interpreted to
require the elimination of a school system's discriminatory policies-a
"process-oriented" approach. 63 It has also been interpreted to require
the achievement of a particular result which is intended to counteract
the consequences of past discriminatory policies-a "result-oriented"
approach.64 The holding in Spangler is "process-oriented" in its em-
phasis on the achievement of a "racially neutral system of student
assignment." 65 The holding is "result-oriented" to the extent that
initial compliance, albeit brief, is remedially sufficient. Proponents of
integration have favored the "result-oriented" approach because its
recognition of the potentially far-reaching consequences of past dis-
crimination gives courts greater latitude in designing desegregation
59. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 458 (1968). See note 26 supra.
60. 427 U.S. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit in Spangler
suggested that the effectiveness of the student assignment plan should be judged by its
"anticipated permanance" in remedying the violation. 519 F.2d at 437. See note 13
supra.
61. See, e.g., Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517(1977),
vacating and remanding United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1976) (for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), because
the extent of busing required by the plan was disproportionate to the constitutional
violation); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (in designing a desegregation remedy,
district lines could be crossed only if an interdistrict violation was shown). See also
Remedies for School Segregation, supra note 22, at 137 (increasing remedial limitations
are evidence of a retreat by the Court from its "prior course of broad, expansive
treatment of school desegregation remedies").
62. See notes 21, 27, 28 & 36 supra.
63. See, Fiss, supra note 22, at 764. The author defines the "process-oriented"
approach as a prohibition against basing decisions on certain forbidden criteria. Once
school board decisions are purged of these forbidden, discriminatory criteria, the goal is
achieved.
64. The "result-oriented" approach aims toward the achievement of a particular
result, for example, improvement of the economic and social position of the protected
group. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 697, 698 (1971)(the "result-oriented" or "de facto"
approach focusses on the segregated patterns themselves).
65. 427 U.S. at 437.
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remedies." The Court in Spangler, however, diluted the "result-
oriented" approach by combining it with the "process-oriented"
approach.
The precedential value of the Spangler decision may be limited by
the narrowness of the Court's holding.67 The majority expressly distin-
guished the "Pasadena Plan's" application of "general terms" from
plans that are "by definition incomplete at inception." ' Under the
latter plan, courts issue minimum requirements which are part of the
total plan and gradually add to the requirements until a "unitary
system" has been achieved. 69 The plan in Spangler, on the other hand,
appeared to contemplate a final goal within its initial requirements.7"
Thus, it is probable that after Spangler, proponents of desegregation
will seek relief in the form of plans "incomplete at inception." But
principles applied in Spangler may implicitly limit court powers even
under these plans. Although the concept of "instant unitariness" does
not seem to be a possible bar to judicial intervention under such plans,
the concept of "piecemeal unitariness" does present a potential limita-
tion.71 If the Supreme Court's trend in limiting the equitable powers of
66. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 765 (in its recognition of the relationship between past
discriminatory acts and present segregation, the decision in Swann was a "giant step"
toward the "result-oriented" approach).
67. 427 U.S. at 444 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68, Id, at 435. The Court cited United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.,
395 U.S. 225 (1969), as an example of a plan "incomplete at inception." In Montgomery,
the Alabama District Court began desegregating the Montgomery School District in 1964
by establishing minimal requirements. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F.
Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964). In order to allow this southern school system to gradually
adjust to integration, requirements were built up in a "step at a time" plan. Such plans
allow student quota provisions, because the district court is in a position to modify such
requirements by maintaining a close supervisory relationship with the school system
through periodic reports, hearings and court orders.
69. Since the decision in Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 770(5th
Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit has required district courts to retain jurisdiction for a period
of not less than three years, during which time semi-annual reports by the school system
are filed. In this way the district courts retain supervisory authority to review school
board actions until the court is satisfied that the school system has achieved unitary
status. See, e.g., Lee v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 514 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hereford v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 504 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
913 (1976); United States v. Hendry County School Dist., 504 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. 427 U.S. at 435. See Brief for Petitioners at 4, Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Petitioners contended that "unlike most desegregation
plans, the Pasadena Plan called for immediate and total desegregation. It was not a plan
that used a step-by-step process. It extirpated all remnants of school segregation im-
mediately." Id.
71. The possibility that one function of a school system will reach the final desegrega-
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district courts continues, 72 questions concerning the scope of judicial
power under such plans, the acceptable length of time for courts to
continue "stepping" toward a "unitary system,"7 3 and the acceptabili-
ty of minimum requirements74 will be raised. Because such plans are
subject to a broad exercise of judicial supervision, judicial authority
and discretion under these plans appears vulnerable to attack under the
Spangler rationale.
More than twenty years after Brown v. Board of Education, segre-
gated conditions still exist throughout the nation. 75 Limitations on the
equitable powers of district courts further diminish the opportunity for
adequate judicial relief.76 The Court's recognition in Spangler of the
tion goal before another funcfion suggests this conclusion. The recognized functions of a
school system (assignment of students, faculty and staff, and allocation of transporta-
tion, extracurricular activities and facilities) may eventually be expanded. For example
in Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964), the
court's initial order required the desegregation of certain grades within the schools.
Under the rationale of Spangler, it would appear that once compliance is complete in
these grades, judicial intervention must cease as to that function of the school system
thus separating the function of student assignment into separate part by grades. See also
note 44 supra.
72. Several suggested reasons may explain this trend. See generally Fiss, supra note
22, at 772 (judicial primacy and activism in desegregation should be reconciled with the
democratic tradition of our nation); Remedies for School Segregation, supra note 22, at
149-51 (trend is partially the result of a balancing between constitutional goals and state
and local interests). But cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Marshall, disagreeing with the majority's limitation of the district
court's equitable power in granting interdistrict relief, contended: "Today's holding, I
fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in
enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral
principles of law.").
73. For an indication of the length of time courts have retained jurisdiction of a
school system, see Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir.
1975) (jurisdiction continued for eleven years); United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate
School Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (the court found the school system
"unitary" after it had operated for seven years "without vestiges of the former dual
system"); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex.
1973) (jurisdiction continued for eight years).
74. According to Spangler, a court may theoretically retain jurisdiction until a final
desegregation goal is reached. 427 U.S. at 436. As long as courts issue minimum
requirements, it seems that they will retain authority to readjust requirements that are
not effective upon implementation.
75. This condition is most predominant in the North and West where in 1972 only
28.3% of minority students attended schools with 50 to 99.9% white enrollment. UNITED
STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL EDUCATION
OPPORTUNrrTY 49 (1975). "There appear to be legitimate fears that the South is...
moving toward a duplication of Northern residential segregation as desegregated schools
are undercut by increasingly segregated neighborhoods and cities." Id. at 61.
76. See Remedies for School Segregation, supra note 22, at 149-51.
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adequacy of brief, though immediate, relief for a constitutional viola-
tion represents a retreat from the achievement of the constitutional
ideal advanced by Brown.
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